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A Graphic Review of the Free
Speech Clause
William Van Alstynet
A number of years ago, Professors Tussman and tenBroek published in this Review an excellent analysis of the equal protection
clause. 1 Using Venn diagrams, they sought to disaggregate various
ways of looking at equal protection claims in order to aid our understanding of what that clause might mean. Their article was not the first
word ever published on the equal protection clause, of course, and certainly it was not meant to be the last. But it did impose an extremely
helpful clarity on what was even then a murky, undisciplined subject,
and it filled a gap in the unruly professional literature. Three decades
later, students of constitutional law still find Tussman-tenBroek graphics a useful starting place.
A similar presentation of the free speech clause is the main object
of this Article. Like the Tussman-tenBroek piece, it disaggregates a
jumble of rival judicial doctrines that purport to define a correct way of
framing questions arising under the free speech clause. My aim is to
determine what is at stake among contending interpretations, and to
see why great importance tends to be attached to such matters. Written
principally for students, this Article, too, proceeds through a series of
graphic depictions, each designed to reflect a distinct impression or interpretation of the free speech clause. To be sure, the different constructions of the clause reflected in these graphics are not exhaustive.2
They do embrace, however, nearly all the basic interpretations that
have competed most strongly for judicial favor during the past century
of Supreme Court adjudications. The Article begins with the simple,
t

Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. Tussman & teuBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALlF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
2. Three versions that will not be reviewed here are the "bad teudency," "advocacy of
illegal conduct," and ''no prior restraint" versions. The first tended to characterize the Supreme
Court majority position throughout the 1920's. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
The second was put forward by Learned Hand in Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1917), and is well described in Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins ofModern First Amendment
JJoctrine: Some Fragments ofHistory, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1975). The third was the sole concern of the common law as summarized in 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE COMMON
LAW 150-54 (1st Am. ed. 1772), discussed in Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 912 (1942). For an excellent recent review of contending doctrines early in this century, see Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981).
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unqualified construction suggested by the face of the clause. Each successive depiction purports to respond to some shortcoming or some perceived difficulty in the more literal or rudimentary graphic it aims to
displace.
The order of presentation will carry us through a fully developed
understanding of the free speech clause. The presentation, however, is
not meant to be faithful to an actual chronology of first amendment
evolution. The doctrines these graphics represent did not in fact appear
as they are described here, nor in this order, in the actual case law of
the first amendment. Indeed, had first amendment doctrine evolved in
the simple linear fashion reflected in this brief review, that progression
would be so much a feature of standard casebooks, treatises, and commercial aids that its reiteration in an article would be unwarranted. It
is, rather, because the case law begins in the middle, as it were, taking
much of its own theory for granted, and then swings haphazardly from
historical to functional or pragmatic influences, that a different, quite
artificial (but more logical) presentation may be needed to clear one's
perspective. It is the very fact of historical discontinuity in the burgeoning case law that provides the occasion for this review.
What follows purports to put no difficult problems to rest nor even
preliminarily to examine the newer sorts of first amendment issues that
are well beyond the scope of any set of introductory graphics. 3 Rather,
this Article addresses only the most traditional and recurring problem
of the first amendment: the extent to which government may ban,
criminalize, or regulate what private citizens seek to say. I mean to
give a useful account as to why, in addressing that problem, anyone
needs to do more than read literally ten consecutive words in the first
amendment: "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech."
The order in which this account is presented will necessarily imply
that the last graphic is also best. Insofar as the first, simplest formulation of the first amendment proves inadequate to answer some problem, the success of the next graphic, so smooth and excellent in
surmounting that problem, will make it appear superior. And so on
with _each successive change to the end. Despite that appearance of
steady progress, however, the reader is urged to withhold judgment and
reserve a healthy skepticism. Each successive interpretation of the free
speech clause tends to be slightly more complicated. Each thereby directs judicial attention to an increasing assortment of issues. As we
3. The newer first amendment problems include: socializing communication resources in
the United States; the government as partisan speaker; the regulation of space satellite companies
as common carriers; and the perplexing difficulties that arise with the many blends of publicprivate property. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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move along, one is readily persuaded that the more complex is also the
more sensitive and the more mature. The natural tendency is to think
we have become more sophisticated, and therefore more correct, in our
understanding. There is impressive historical evidence, however, that
this logical complacency may be seriously misplaced.
In matters of constitutional interpretation, the complex is not necessarily better than the simple. Simple propositions speak bluntly and
commandingly. Complex propositions full of "ifs," ''unlesses," or "excepts" do not. Nicely qualified, complex formulations may be necessary and proper for statutory codes. They may be profoundly
uninspiring in a constitution-the fundamental law of a nation.
Additionally, a first amendment taken literally and simply is more
difficult to evade. Graphics that are more mature and intellectually
pleasing are not better if they but multiply the means by which judges
may find reasons to give way. 4 We may therefore need to worry more
about standards of judicial review that facilitate judicial discretion and
the judicial tendency to yield to intolerance than about standards that
are seemingly too simplistic. This issue is not merely of rhetorical concern, moreover, because historically our judges have tended generally
to honor the apparent rigor of the free speech clause most when it least
mattered and least when the judges were most seriously tested. In relatively tranquil times, the words of the first amendment have been given
considerable force. In times of national anxiety and widespread xenophobia, on the other hand, the same words have frequently been given
little more than a dismissive acknowledgment. 5 In the critical literature, the many successful prosecutions beginning with the Sedition Act
of 1798,6 the Espionage Act of World War I/ and the Smith Act fol4. Consider Justice Black's very forceful remarks in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109, 143-44 (1961) (dissenting opinion):
To apply the Court's balancing test . . . is to read the First Amendment to say
'Congress shall pass no law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition,
unless Congress and the Supreme Court reach the joint conclusion that on balance the
interest of the Government in stifling those freedoms is greater than the interest of the
people in having them exercised.'. . . [U]nless we once again accept the notion that the
Bill of Rights means what it says and that this Court must enforce that meaning, I am of
the opinion that our great Charter of liberty will be more honored in the breach than in
the observance.
See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61-65 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Reich, Mr.
Justice Block and the Living Constitution, 16 HARV. L. Rev. 673, 736-44 (1963).
5. See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 563 (''The Supreme Court . . . can do nothing to
keep discussion open during an emergency.").
6. Act of July 21, 1798, ch. 74, §II, 1 Stat. 596, critically reviewed in L. LEVY, LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION (1960) and J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETIERS-THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES (1956).
7. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217. See also Sedition Act of May 16,
1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553, critically reviewed in Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 36-140, in which the
author states that-in-more-than 2,000 prosecutions, "[a]lmost all the convictions were for expres-
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lowing World War II, 8 are offered as depressing examples.
At the end of our brief graphic excursion through the free speech
clause, therefore, it may be both provocative and important for the
reader to look back one last time to the beginning. We shall have
moved a fair distance intellectually-but not necessarily a good or reassuring distance politically. Indeed, at the end, one may privately count
it heavily against the practical wisdom of any doctrine that answers
smoothly to every kind of problem, but yields in practice to an ancien
regime intolerant of civil liberty. There is no more durable or worthwhile problem than this in our constitutionallaw, 9 and even now we
have very little reason to think we have mastered it. More embarrassing still, it is far from clear that we are even on the right track.
I
THE LITERAL CONSTRUCTION

In respect to freedom of speech, the first amendment is exceptionally crisp and unambiguous. Thus, it provides: Congress shall make no
law abridging the freedom of speech. Most of the principal affirmative
restrictions on government power are far more ambiguous or equivocal. For instance, the fourth amendment protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" only
against "unreasonable searches and seizures." The fifth amendment assures each person that he or she will not be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without "due process." The eighth amendment prohibits
only such bail or such fines as are "excessive" and forbids only "cruel
and unusual punishments."
From the style of these amendments, it is quite clear that the rights
or freedoms they secure are limited. Each contains an obvious negative
pregnant. Fines that are not excessive, for instance, are evidently permitted. One may, likewise, even be deprived of life assuming only that
the legal process was appropriate (j. e. , that "due" process was observed). Additionally, the necessary referents of the crucial adjectives
that are not self-defining ("unreasonable," "due," "excessive," "cruel,"
"unusual") lie outside the words of the Constitution. They not only
permit interpretation by external reference; they direct such an exercise.
The first amendment is strikingly different. On its face, it is both
sions of opinion about the merits and conduct of the war," id. at p. 51; A. KELLY & W. HARBISON,
THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 664-70 (1955).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976), described and reviewed in 1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N. DOR·
SEN, PoLmCAL AND CIVIL RiGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 104-55 (3d ed. 1967).
9. The most recent and able review of this problem is Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its
A/lure and Impossibility, 53 IND. LJ. 399 (1978), reprinted in 1. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
I-41 (1980).
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unequivocal and absolute. It requires no arcane learning to understand
the clear and plain meaning of "Congress," "no law," "abridging," or
"speech." To "abridge" means not merely to forbid altogether, but to
curtail or to lessen. And the laws forbidden to Congress are not merely
such as "unreasonably" abridge speech (cf., the fourth amendment),
nor are they laws that are "excessive" abridgments of speech. The imperative is simple, straightforward, complete, and absolute: Congress
shall make no law abridging the freedom

of speech.

None of this is to say that no difficult questions of construction
arise under the first amendment. They are. questions, however, that
arise only in instances where the facts are not clearly within the terms
of the amendment. For instance, an act of Congress making it a crime
to criticize the president, as applied to a person speaking critically of
the president, is plainly within the amendment and therefore plainly
unconstitutional. Whether an act of Congress making it a crime to destroy a draft registration card is also within the amendment, on the
other hand, may be debatable; it is contingent upon. one's view of
equating the tearing of a pasteboard in the course of a speech against
the draft with speech. Io Similarly, an act of Congress making it a crime
to criticize any federal judge is plainly within the amendment and, accordingly, invalid. On the other hand, whether an attempt by a federal
judge to silence either a witness in court or speakers outside the courtroom also raises any kind of first amendment issues is a different (and
more difficult) question. The amendment says only that Congress shall
make no law abridging the freedom of speech; on its face, the first
amendment is not directed either to the judiciary or to the executive. II
If the source of abridgment is a law made by Congress and if what
10. It is not speech, of course, but there may be persuasive instrumental reasons for deeming
it so. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning of draft cards, in the setting of an
anti-war rally, giveu marginal first amendment protection).
11. A surprising number of commentators have concluded that, for this reason alone, the
first amendment cannot be taken literally because it would leave unrestrained, incorrigible opportunities for the executive and judicial departments of the United States to suppress free speech in
ways that must have been meant to be forbidden under the first amendment. It is not clear,
however, whether such easy criticism is well founded. The extent of the problem depends partly
upon one's view ofhow much of the executive power and how much of the judicial power do not
depend upon acts of Congress.
Most of what the President can do may in fact be derived from enabling legislation by Congress, rather than by force of his power as provided for in article II. The same is true of our
federal courts under article DI. When particular uses of the executive and judicial power proceed
pursuant to authorizations and enabling legislation by Congress, they are subject to the first
amendment, which makes no exception for acts of Congress merely becanse they may also be in
aid of the executive or judicial powers, as distinct from acts of Congress in aid of its own enumerated powers. The consequence may be that the actual ambit of executive and judicial power
unaffected by a literal first amendment (because not consequential to any act of Congress) would
be very small, confined at the outset, and not as important to restrict as that of Congress. I have
dealt with this problem obliquely in a different article, however, and there is little reason to deal
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the law expressly abridges is speech, however, the amendment itself
appears to end the inquiry. 12 What kind of speech is involved (e.g.,
whether political or commercial, private or public, obscene or religious)
is, on the face of the amendment, not a question. And equally, whether
the speech seems trivial rather than important, reprehensible rather
than edifying, or remarkably insightful rather than fraught with danger, are also not questions. For the point, again, is that while one may
always have an appropriate interest as to how this amen~ment came
about (e.g., what purposes it was meant to serve, why it was proposed,
whether as approved and ratified it enacted a proposition thoughtful
people would find entirely too dogmatic), it is nonetheless this amendment that did come about. 13 If one finds it too strong or ridiculous
(e.g., if one thinks it should be recast in terms consistent with the moderation of the fourth, fifth, and eighth amendments, or if one thinks
that nothing more than a speech fetishism could account for such an
with it here. See Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in J)etermining Incidental Powers ofthe Pres/·
dent and of the Federal Courts, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 102 (1976).
12. The inquiry may not be ended if it is the kind of speech that the copyright clause enables
Congress to confide an exclusive property right in others to control pursuant to its power under
art. I, § 8, cl. 8, ''to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." For
an opening discussion, see Nimmer, J)oes Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantee of
Free Speech and Press?, 11 U.C.LA L. REV. 1180 (1970).
13. Note, for instance, how the first amendment differs from the second amendment in this
respect. The first amendment does not link the protection it provides with any particular objective
and may, accordingly, be deemed to operate without regard to anyone's view of how well the
speech it protects may or may not serve such an objective. The second amendment expressly links
the protection it provides with a stated objective ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free state") and might, therefore, be deemed to operate only insofar as the right it
protects ("the right of the people to keep and bear arms") can be shown to be connected with that
objective.
The different modes of the first and second amendments are not unique in this regard. The
enumeration of powers vested in Congress, in art. I, § 8, reflects a similar difference. For instance,
whatever the reasons contributing to the grant, the vesting of power in Congress to "regulate
co=erce among the several states" is textually not bounded by any statement of purpose or
objective in respect to the exercise of that power. On the other hand, the vesting of power in
Congress to secure "to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries" has two textual qualifications. The first may be implied by the introductory phrase
accompanying the grant of power, that this power is vested in Congress "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts." The second is express, in that the power is one to grant an "exclusive
Right" for "limited Times," and not in perpetuity. Thus, while the Supreme Court might defer to
Congress on both matters, it might also, consistent with the text, check Congress with respect to
either matter. The Court might, for example, hold unconstitutional a vesting of exclusive patent
or copyright that in the Court's view has no rational connection with promoting the progress of
science or any useful art, or it might hold unconstitutional a vesting of exclusive patent or copy·
right that in the Court's view is unnecessarily long or excessive to fair protection. On the other
hand, the court would regard the co=erce power as plenary, as indeed it has in an overwhelm·
ing number of cases. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (congres·
sionally approved discriminatory state tax statute sustained); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321
(1903) (act of Congress destroying, rather than enhancing, interstate co=erce sustained); Gib·
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
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amendment), article V of the Constitution provides a mechanism for
implementing the change that requisite majorities in Congress and in
the states may prefer. In the meantime, we have the first amendment as
it appears and, as it does appear it is in contrast to, rather than in similarity to, the moderation of other provisions in the Bill of Rights. A
suitable graphic of the first amendment might therefore look like this:

Acts of
Congress

100% Protected
FREEDOM OF SPEECH

There are no lines, no intersecting points, no shaded areas of less protected or of unprotected speech. The graphic, though singularly uninteresting, is also perfect and inviolate.
II
''THE" FREEDOM OF SPEECH

Despite the simplicity and logical force of a literal interpretation of
the first amendment, it has never commanded a majority of the
Supreme Court. Primarily it has failed against the pressures of irresistible counterexamples, rationalized by an uncertain early history. An
"irresistible counterexample" is an instance that is plainly within the
literal prohibition of the amendment, but that one is nonetheless unwilling to defend. The necessary consequence is to concede that there
must be some degree of moderation contemplated by the first amendment despite first impressions to the contrary.
Possibly the best known counterexample is a variation of an instance used by Mr. Justice Holmes: a person knowingly and falsely
shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater for the perverse joy of anticipating the spectacle of others being trampled to death as the panicked
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crowd surges toward the theater exit. 14 The counterexample could as
well be: the mere oral statement of one person to another, offering to
pay $5,000 for the murder of the offeror's spouse; a Congressman's
bribe solicitation; an interstate manufacturer's deliberately false and
misleading commercial advertisements; a witness committing perjury
in the course of a trial; or a member of the public interrupting (by
speaking) someone else already speaking at a city council meeting. The
counterexample need not be more complicated than a simple, soft
statement made to the president that he will be shot if he fails to veto a
particular bill or fails to grant a certain pardon.
Some of these examples may be defended (ie., some persons will
be willing to defend some of them as protected by the first amendment), and some may be distinguished (ie., it will be said that they do
not involve speech or that, rather, they involve "speech plus"). 15 Most
of us, however, will recognize that this second response is a mere cavil.
Lying on the witness stand is not less speech than lying about the
weather (or, for that matter, than telling the truth about the weather),
although it may also be perjury. The shout of "Fire!" is not less speech
in the Holmes instance than the shout of "Fire!" from the mouth of an
actor on the stage of the same theater, spoken as but a word in a play. 16
It is futile to argue that an appropriately tailored law that punishes any
or all of these utterances does not abridge speech. It does, it is meant
to, and one should not take recourse to verbal subterfuge, e.g. , that it is
"speech-brigaded-with-action" or "conduct" alone that is curtailed by
laws reaching these cases. These ersatz arguments prove too much; the
same definitional artifices must necessarily operate to demolish the simple, compelling picture of a literal first amendment.
The objection of the irresistible counterexample thus upsets one's
14. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (''The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.''),
15. In several cases, Justice Black wrote strongly and approvingly of a first amendment with
no exceptions. See, e.g., his opinions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964)
(Black, J., concurring); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). Even so, his own
discernment of "speech plus" led him to vote to sustain many laws believed to be unconstitutional
under the first amendment even by more conservative colleagues not sharing his "absolute" commitment to the first amendment. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576,609 (1969) (Blaek, J., dissenting); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S.
503,515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). See also Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Jus/lee
Black on lhe Firs/ Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 428 (1967). Efforts at such distinctions have
created difficulties for other "strong" first amendment writers as well. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION "80·89 (1970).
16. The point has not escaped theatrical parody. See T. STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ &
GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD, Act II, at 60 (1967).
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confidence in an absolute freedom of speech, despite the singular language of the first amendment itself. And, on closer examination, even
the language of the first amendment may provide explicit accommodation (f. e., exclusion) of an indefinite number of these counterexamples.
Specifically, it provides (merely) that: Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech.
In complete fidelity to that language, a graphic depiction of the
first amendment might look like this:

Acts of
Congress

100% Protected

"THE" FREEDOM OF SPEECH

(Criminal
Perjury
Obscenity (?)
Defamation (J)
Commercial
fraud(?)
Etc.)

According to this view, 17 the first amendment is still quite different
from several other amendments. When it applies, it applies absolutely-without balancing or weighing circumstances. Thus, it still
stands in contrast to the fourth amendment ("unreasonable" .searches
and seizures), the fifth amendment ("due" process), or the eighth
amendment ("cruel and unusual" punishments). Consistent with this
understanding, however, is the necessity of determining whether speech
abridged by a given act of Congress is not within "the" freedom of
speech that Congress may make no law abridging. And here, admit17. This view is evidently shared by seemingly "strong" first amendment proponents such as
Zechariah Chafee. See Z. CHAFEE, Stlpra note 2, at 14, 145, 149-50 ("We can all agree that the
free speech clauses do not wipe out tli.e common law as to obscenity, profanity, and defamation of
individuals. . . . [O]bscenity, profanity, and gross libels upon individuals . . . fall outside the
protection of the free speech clauses as I have defined them . . . (as do criminal solicitation or
even talking "scurrilously about the flag]."). See also Justice Holmes' opinion in Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) ("We venture to believe that neither Hamilton nor
Madison, nor any other competent person then or later, ever supposed that to make criminal the
counseling of a murder ... would be an unconstitutional interference with speech."). Other (and
much more dispiriting) early Holmes opinions are comprehensively reviewed in Rabban, SlljJTO
note 2, at 533-40.
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tedly, nothing in the language of the amendment itself is definitive or
even helpful. Some external referent must be used to provide the distinction between that speech within "the" freedom of speech and that
speech not within it.
It is noteworthy, however, that there is still no balancing or weighing of circumstances so far as the first amendment is concerned, whichever side of the line particular speech may lie. If it is within "the"
freedom of speech, as we have already noted, it is absolutely protected.
If it is not within "the" freedom of speech, the first amendment (by its
own terms) does not affect it at all. Correspondingly, the first amendment imposes no special burden on Congress to justify laws abridging
utterances not within "the" freedom of speech. The amendment is not
directed to those utterances; it demands nothing of laws presuming to
abridge such speech. Accordingly, it is inappropriate to require that
any sort of "clear and present danger'' be proved in respect to such
speech for the very same reason that, on the other side of the line, it
remains utterly irrelevant for government to try to prove some sort of
"clear and present danger'' to defend an abridgment.
The second graphic is thus fundamentally like the first graphic in
respect to a common characteristic that continues to distinguish it from
other portions of the Bill of Rights-the quality of absoluteness that
makes balancing irrelevant. It differs from tli.e first graphic only with
respect to the unsettling uncertainty it introduces by compelling an unspecified external reference to settle the content of "the" freedom of
speech. The proper reference is to . . . what? There is obviously no
appendix attached to the first amendment that authoritatively lists the
varieties of speech within and without "the" freedom of speech. And
neither has anyone claimed discovery of such a lucid, uniform, and
established consensus respecting "the" freedom of speech in 1789 such
that, by clear convention, its content was (or is) universally obvious. 18
To a significant extent, however, the second graphic is reflected in
18. For example, Professor Chafee concluded that the central minimum intention of the
drafters and ratifiers of the first amendment was "to wipe out the common law of sedition, and
make further prosecutions for criticism of the government, without any incitement to law-breaking, forever impossible in the United States of America." Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 21. The
Supreme Court has accepted this conclusion. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276
(1964) ("Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has
carried the day in the court of history. . . . [There has been] a broad consensus that the Act,
because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment.").
The matter, however, did not always appear so clear. There is, for instance, a growth in the
impressions of Justice Holmes on the same question who wrote in 1907:
[T]he main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments,' and they do not
prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public
welfare.
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
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the case law of the first amendment. The Supreme Court has treated
speech deemed "obscene," for instance, as not within ''the" freedom of
speech absolutely protected by the first amendment. Rather, the case
law neither absolutely protects obscene speech nor even requires any
first amendment compelled justification for its criminalization. 19 And
in general, the same holds true for ordinary criminal solicitation,20 as it
once did (although no longer does) for libel, "fighting words," 21 and
Then, by 1919, he wrote:
It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main purpose,
as intimated in Patterson v. Colorado . . . .
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919).
Finally, much ruore emphatically in the same year, he stated:
I wholly disagree with the argument of the Government that the First Amendment left
the common law as to seditious libel in force. History seems to me against the notion.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting opinion).
Yet, in 1960, Professor Levy reluctantly concluded:
If ... a choice must be made between two propositions, first, that the clause [i.e., the
freedom of speech-and-press clause] substantially embodied the Blackstonian definition
and left the law of seditious libel in force, or second, that it repudiated Blackstone and
superseded the common law, the known evidence points strongly in support of the former proposition. Contrary to Justice Holmes, history favors the notion.
L. LEVY, supra note 6, at 248 (1960).
19. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S 476,483,485 (1957) ("In light of this history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every
utterance. . . . We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press."). The principle was subsequently reaffirmed. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23
(1973) ("This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment."). The ruost recent effort to defend this distinction is Schauer,
Speech and "Speech "-Obscenity and "Obscenity'~· An Exercise in the Interpreting of Constitutional
Language, 67 GEO. LJ. 899, 905-06 (1979). See also T. EMERSON, supra note 15, at 401-12. A
more general defense of "definitional balancing" (!:e., judicially defining which kinds of speech
are, and which are not, within the protection of the first amendment) is presented in Nimmer, The
Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to
Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1968).
20. The subject is comprehensively reviewed in Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B.
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 645.
21. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words.") (emphasis added), overruled in part,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255, 268 (1964) ("[L]ibel can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations. It ruust be measured by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment."). See also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (reversing conviction of
person scufiling with a police officer who had told him, "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you"; ''you
son of a bitch, I'll choke you to death"); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (modifying
Chaplinsky to apply only when the willfully provocative language "rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest," without regard to whether it "stirs people to anger''). For an
impressive recent case, see Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), qjf'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir. 1978) (proposed Nazi march planned for neighborhood inhabited by many Jews personally
victims of German concentration camps). See also Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 69 Ill. 2d
605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
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"commercial speech."22 Since none of these is within "the" freedom of
speech that Congress may make no law abridging, Congress has been
allowed to abridge these kinds of speech except insofar as other kinds
of constitutional constraints lying outside the first amendment may affect the problem (e.g., constraints of enumerated powers, due process,
or fifth amendment standards of equal protection).
III
DETERMINING THE BOUNDARIES OF "THE" FREEDOM
OF SPEECH

Even if the definitional boundary between "the" freedom of
speech, which may not be abridged, and speech that may be abridged is
the sole uncertainty respecting the first amendment, the picture provided by the second graphic may be somewhat incomplete. If we stipulate that Congress shall make no law abridging "the" freedom of
speech, it remains important to secure absolute protection of whatever
speech is protected. Advertently or otherwise, however, in making laws
abridging unprotected speech, Congress may in fact make a law that
abridges the protected freedom of speech. If it drafts a postal obscenity
law too broadly, for instance, the law thus made by Congress may at
once "abridge" speech that itself is within "the" freedom of speech,
although no one in fact has yet been prosecuted. Or if interstate "criminal solicitation" is outlawed by Congress, the uncertainty of the offense may at once abridge (i.e. , curtail) solicitations within the freedom
of speech said to be absolutely protected. If, in addition, the sanctions
are extremely severe and/or the procedures attending enforcement of
the act of Congress quite summary, then the foreseeable prohibited
abridging effects are more obvious and more substantial. In brief,
under the view we are now examining, when the first amendment applies, it applies absolutely. And the amendment does not merely provide that no one may be jailed or fined for utterances within "the"
freedom of speech. Rather, it provides that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech. The amendment stands violated by
the making of a law insofar as the making itself abridges "the" freedom
of speech.
One way of enforcing the prohibition (to halt the immediate
abridging effects from the mere making of such laws) would be to provide a citizen's right of immediate appeal to the courts, incidental to the
22. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled in pari, Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760-62 (1976) ("Here, •.• (the]
question whether there is a First Amendment exception for 'commercial speech' is squarely before
ns. . . . Our question, then, is whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of the
First Amendment. . . . Our answer is that it is not.").
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mere enactment by Congress of any law dealing with speech. The
function of the appeal, of course, would be to determine at once
whether the speech thus dealt with by Congress is in whole or in part
within ''the" freedom of speech protected by the first amendment, in
which case the law ought at once to be judicially set aside. A less perfect procedure will require a longer delay before an act of Congress can
come to the Court. By definition, during the delay that occurs after
Congress has made the law and prior to its authoritative adjudication,
the first amendment will stand violated. To the extent that other doctrines nonetheless operate to create such delays (e.g., the case or controversy requirement of article III or ancillary requirements of standing),
in fact the first amendment will not have been effective.23 On the other
hand, some speech not within "the" freedom of speech will go unpunished if the entire law, when :finally adjudicated, is held wholly invalid
because of the overbreadth or vagueness of only some of its provisions.24 A modified graphic that takes both kinds of effects into account may therefore look like this:
23. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (allegations of present speech-inhibiting
consequences of Army intelligence surveillance of dissident civilian groups held insufficient to
secure ripeness or standing under article III); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971) (allegations of
chilling effect from enacted antispeech criminal statutes insufficient); United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (denial of declaratory judgment sought by federal civil servants alleging they were intimidated from pursuing particular political activities by a federal statute prohibiting "any active part in political management or in political campaigns."). An exceptionally able
review of this subject is provided in Albert, Justiciabr1ity and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50S. CAL. L. REv. 1139 (1977).
24. In this respect, the Supreme Court does take the first amendment literally. It examines
the law as made and holds it invalid if, as made, the law abridges speech, even though as applied
the law does not contravene the first amendment because the speech involved is not protected. See
e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) ("It matters not that the words appellee used
might have been constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly and precisely drawn statute."). See
also Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (conviction reversed due to facial overbreadth of
ordinance); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (conviction reversed because ordinance as drafted was unconstitutionally broad, although as subsequently construed by state
supreme court it would presumably be valid as applied to the very facts of the case). The use of
these doctrines thus tends to offset the inability of parties to secure a more timely adjudication of
an act when first made, although at the corresponding cost of enabling some guilty (i.e., otherwise
punishable) parties to go free.
In one respect, the doctrines of "void-on-its-face" for first amendment overbreadth and/or
vagueness are identical to the exclusionary rule disallowing evidence gained by means incousistent with fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961):.-In the one case, the "criminal" goes free because the constable blundered. In the other, the criminal goes free because the legislature blundered. Still, there are
grounds for distinguishing the bases of the two rules. Nothing in the text of the fourth amendment
itself precludes the use of evidence, however wrongfully secured. But, since the text of the first
amendment forbids Congress to make a law abridging protected speech, when the only law applicable abridges speech, it is logical for a court to hold that it cannot be invoked. For an able review
of rationales addressed to these problems, see BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech:
An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978).
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The third graphic presents a discouraging picture of a first amendment less perfect and less self-executing than the first depiction in two
respects we have noted. First, consistent with its own language and
consistent with a number of irresistible counterexamples, the third
graphic, like the second graphic, admits that there are kinds of speech
not within "the" freedom of speech. The more discouraging consequence of this observation, moreover, is that the amendment itself not
only fails explicitly to list those excluded kinds of speech, but on its
face, provides no clue as to what they are. Necessarily, then, courts are
compelled to discover them at large with ample room to reach differing
enumerations. This latitude subjects much of first amendment adjudication to fashions of judicial discretion.
Second, because the Constitution itself provides no mechanism to
perfect an appeal from Congress, congressional abridgments of "the"
protected freedom of speech may not be immediately challenged,
which allows the literal command of the first amendment prohibiting
the making of such laws to be defeated. The discretion of the judiciary
in determining when a case may be brought and who may bring it also
operates to commit the actual fate of "the" freedom of speech to judicial vagary. Much of "the" freedom of speech thus may be effectively
curtailed by the intimidating presence of the outstanding act of Congress. Judicial sympathy with the unconstitutional objectives of the act
also may conspire to defeat the command of the amendment by operation to impose severe restrictions on the testing of that law.
But in neither respect is the resulting situation much avoidable,
insofar as it appears, substantially, to be an intrinsic problem of the
first amendment exactly as it is drawn. To put the matter differently,
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these shortcomings are not solely the result of a studied effort to limit
the scope of the first amendment. Although they can be exacerbated by
congressional or judicial hostility, they arise essentially because of the
amendment's language, the inevitability of congressional error, and the
limitations of judicial review.
On the bright side, however, the third graphic still has much to
commend it. So long as an utterance is within "the" freedom of speech
contemplated by the amendment and its prohibition is subject to judicial review, it remains fully and unequivocally protected. Passion, deference, and bias in the judiciary may make the line between "the"
freedom of speech and unprotected speech discouragingly unstable, but
at least they may not operate twice-once to define the boundary and
still again to balance away even fully protected speech against some
notion of reasonable or necessary abridgments.
IV
THE BOUNDED SCOPE OF ''THE FREEDOM" OF SPEECH

The logical force of the second and third graphics lies in their accommodation of irresistible counterexamples and almost literal consistency with the complete language of the first amendment. However,
there is an alternative equally responsive to both concerns. Indeed, it
may be superior to both the second and third graphics insofar as it
eliminates the boundary between "the" freedom of speech (which alone
is protected by the amendment) and other speech placed outside the
amendment's protection. This alternative view thus forecloses any
claim of judicial discretion to fix an unstable boundary and, to that
extent, is superior.
This alternative falls back on the language of the first amendment
to embrace the common-sense impression with which we started: all
speech is protected from abridging laws made by Congress without exception. That the speech at issue is a fragment of perjured testimony
does not make it any less speech nor remove it from the amendment. It
stands initially on exactly the same footing as a political candidate's
unexceptional campaign remarks, or an ordinary citizen's street comer
complaints about national economic policy.
The instance of the irresistible counterexample is met, moreover,
not by question-begging verbal artifices (e.g., by calling it "conduct,"
"speech-brigaded-with-action," or "speech-acts"), but by a different
and more general definition of "the freedom of speech" that Congress
may make no law abridging. ''The freedom of speech" that Congress
may make no law abridging is a qualifYing phrase, albeit not in the
manner suggested in graphics two or three. Rather, "the freedom of
speech" that Congress may not by law abridge is a reference to some
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scope of freedom implied by the very term "the freedom" and, logically, therefore, a scope of freedom bounded. In short, it stands not as
a synonym for complete freedom, but as a contrast with complete freedom. "The freedom" of speech that Congress may make no law
abridging is therefore that degree, or that extent, of freedom of speech
that Congress may make no law abridging.
This view of the amendment abandons judicial discretion to say
what is and what is not the subject matter of speech protected by the
amendment-although it necessarily asserts an alternative discretion to
say what is the scope of "the freedom of speech" within the meaning of
"the freedom" as distinct from unlimited or unqualified complete freedom. Again, and unavoidably, it compels even a conscientious and reluctant judiciary to utilize some reference external to the first
amendment to determine that scope. Thus, it inevitably reintroduces
instability into the first amendment, although in a different way. But
the instability is another instance that caunot be helped, since the force
of the irresistible counterexample will not go away and the very language of the first amendment contributes to the integrity of coping with
it in this fashion (quite apart from the highly uncertain history associated with the amendment). A graphic depiction of the first amendment
thus described might look like this:
''THE FREEDOM"
OF SPEECH

''THE FREEDOM"

SPEECH BEYOND

100% Protected

0% Protected

All Kinds of Speech

Note, then, these several features. First, all speech is encompassed
by the amendment, whether it be talk about the weather, one's choice
of elected representatives, or procuring heroin. Second, "the freedom"
of speech refers to a latitude, rather than to a subject or a kind of
speech. Third, the exclusive question in each case is merely whether
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the utterances were within that latitude of freedom of speech comprising "the freedom" of speech that Congress may make no law abridging.
And the irresistible counterexample is accounted for insofar as it may
be expected to fall outside the latitude of "the freedom" of speech, albeit the referent for determining whether it does is not provided by the
first amendment itself and necessarily, therefore, requires the judiciary
to look elsewhere.
To a considerable extent, this view of the first amendment has not
only characterized a substantial number of Supreme Court decisions,
but also dominated the entire first amendment case law. Indeed, the
main struggle has been among contending views respecting the appropriate test according to which speech is held to be either within "the
freedom" of speech protected from abridging laws, or beyond that freedom and therefore unaffected by the first amendment. A leading example is the following formulation proposed by Judge Learned Hand
and approved by a Supreme Court majority in 1951 in .Dennis v. United
States: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as
is necessary to avoid the danger." 25 Note the discrete elements of this
formulation, and especially the several unavoidable determinations
that it commits to the judiciary. Most obviously, it commits to the judiciary a textually unaided directive to rank-order all possible "evils."
As well, of course, it implicitly directs a determination of what legislatures are constitutionally empowered to define as evil for purposes of
criminalizing speech likely to produce that evil. The determination of
what may be deemed evils and the rank-order of their gravities is imperative, because the requisite degree of probability sufficient to place
particular speech beyond "the freedom" of speech forbidden to be
abridged is itself dependent upon the evil's gravity. The greater evil,
the less probable need be its occurrence to forbid speech generating
some tendency that the evil might occur. The particular formulation
looks like this:
25. 341

u.s. 494, 510 (1951).

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

124

[Vol. 70: 107

100%

Onprolecled Speech
Probability
of
Event

I"THE FREEDOM" OF SPEECH

I

_t______________________ UP-'P
I

"

0% ~~------------------------~
0
Gravity of Evil
100
(Simple Trespass)

(Homicide)

The vertical axis is graduated from zero probability to absolute
certainty. The horizontal axis is graduated from evils of zero gravity to
those of absolute gravity. The diagonal line cutting across the graphic
marks the boundary of that scope of speech within "the freedom" of
speech that Congress may make no law abridging. All cases to the left
of the line are protected. All cases to the right of the line are
unprotected.
Two examples illustrate the apparent objectivity and completeness
of the arrangement. The first example of simple trespass is drawn from
an opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis.26 It supposes that a legislature has
made it a crime (albeit a minor one) for persons to be on the private
property of another knowing that the owner does not want them. It is
assumed that the trespass law is itself valid (ie., that the legislature
may protect private property in this fashion and deem officious intrusions an evil within the police power to prevent). It is assumed also
that the trespass is fairly mild-trespassing on a privately owned vacant
lot, for instance, as distinct from trespassing upon another's bedroom at
night. The case likewise supposes the same legislature adopted a law to
discourage the incident of trespass by making it a minor crime for any
person to advocate, urge, counsel, incite, or teach to others the desirablity of trespassing.
The law thus punishes speech. But it is not on that account either
valid or invalid, for its validity requires that in each case we discount
26.

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377-78 (1927) (concurring opinion).
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the gravity of the evil (which is not the speech but rather an act of
trespass) by its improbability. Since the evil (simple trespass) is a comparatively trivial evil, nothing less than virtual certainty that it would
occur unless the speech were forbidden will suffice to justify proceeding
against the speaker. So, if an anarchist urges a handful of half-interested citizens to trespass on a posted vacant lot in order to demonstrate
their objection to a social order that sanctifies private property, the
speaker cannot be convicted when it is plain no one did as the speaker
urged, nor was likely to do so. All such trivial evil-inducing speech is
within that latitude of "the freedom" of speech protected by the first
amendment save that which actually engenders the evil to be avoided
or, at least, very nearly engenders it. Most such cases are thus "P"
(protected) cases on the graph. Very few will be "UP" (unprotected).
The converse is true for homicide. The killing of people being a
plain instance of what legislatures may rightly consider a grave evil,
speech foreseeably engendering a bare possibility of that consequence
becomes at once punishable. Virtually all such speech save, perhaps,
utterances one may make aloud in his bedroom with no one about is
thus "UP" (unprotected). Only a harmless few are "P" (protected). Indeed, given the gravity of this evil, it is likely that in many situations
even a post hoc showing of zero likelihood of its occurring will not save
it under the first amendment. For example, the prohibition would
reach a speaker who solicited another to murder his spouse when, unknown to the speaker, the solicitee was an undercover officer who acknowledged that at no time did he consider acting on the inducement.
One great (although little noted) advantage of the manner in
which this particular graphic depiction addresses ''the freedom" of
speech is its applicability to a number of incidental issues. These are
issues conventionally treated separately in the case law of the first
amendment, such as those of "reasonable time, place, and manner," 27
and issues of so-called "indirect effects."28 In fact, the Learned Hand
27. Compare Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (breach of peace convictions
reversed in circumstances of large-scale and somewhat boisterous racial demonstration on state
house grounds), with Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (criminal trespass convictions affirmed in circumstances of smaller, less boisterous racial demonstration on jail grounds); compare
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (breach of peace conviction reversed for silent, racial
protest stand·in in public library unteroom), with Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972)
(breach of peace conviction sustained for noisy demonstration within 100 feet of high school during school day) ("The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictates the kinds of
regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.' "). The most recent decision in this
heavily case-congested subject is Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981).
28. These are cases in which no speech is forbidden by law but where, for instance, being
obliged to say something may under the circumstances indirectly inhibit one's ability or willingness to speak candidly. See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (duty to
publish a reply by any candidate for office disparaged by the newspaper, held invalid); Lamont v.
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formulation is quite capable of resolving virtually all free speech adjudications, as a few additional examples may make clear.
"Reasonable time, place, and manner'' restrictions do not forbid
particular utterances (e.g., advocacy of trespass, incitement of arson or
homicide, obscenity, or racial epithets) but merely restrict the time or
the place of speech or regulate the manner of speaking.29 For example,
a disorderly conduct law may not apply to one who shouts his message
or even amplifies his speech over loudspeakers in an auditorium,30 but
may apply to one who shouts his message on a street comer downtown
or amplifies his speeeh over loudspeakers carried on a van through residential neighborhoods. 31 The Hand formulation we have been examining is adequate in responding to this problem: merely isolate the evil
alleged to arise from the time, place, or manner of speaking; determine
initially whether it rests within the legislative prerogative to deem it an
evil; identify its relative gravity at the proper point somewhere along
the horizontal axis; and finally, ascertain in the particular case the
probability that the particular time, place, or manner of the speech will
in fact bring about that evil. Having thus located the degree of
probability at some point on the vertical axis, it is easy enough as a
figurative exercise to draw the proper lines to see whether they intersect
in the protected zone or the unprotected zone of the rectangle.
The same is true for controversies conventionally catalogued as
instances of "indirect effects." Such a case arises when the regulation
in question does not forbid or restrict speech, but demands that one
speak under pain of punishment for failure to do so. But, paradoxically, it may still be obvious under the circumstances that "the freedom" of speech is threatened and a straightforward first amendment
question presented.32 An example is a law that requires a journalist to
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (compelled indication of wanting to receive certain mail, as
a condition of having such mail delivered, held invalid); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)
(prohibition of anonymous handbills, held invalid). Frequently, although there is no prohibition
upon what may be said, it is the "indirect effect" of a "reasonable time, place, and manner"
restriction that effects the speech or press abridgment. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1
(1978) (restriction on press access to jail of questionable condition upheld).
29. See cases at note 27 supra.
30. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (breach of peace conviction of speaker reversed where demagogic auditorium harangue attracted angry crowd outside).
31. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (disorderly conduct conviction for refusing
police officer's request to cease street comer harangue attracting hostile crowd at busy intersection
affirmed); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (misdemeanor conviction for "loud and raucous
sounding truck" in business district upheld; dicta suggesting court would be favorable to similar
restriction in residential areas).
32. See cases and discussion at note 28 supra. See also Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971)
(ineligibility for bar from refusal to disclose membership in certain organization reversed as unduly discouraging citizens "from exercising rights protected by the Constitution"); Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investig. Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (six-month jail term and $1,200 fine for contempt
in refusing to identify names of NAACP members to state legislative committee reversed).
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disclose in a civil or criminal proceeding the name of some person and
the exact statements that person may have spoken to the journalist.
The occasion for summoning the journalist, moreover, may typically be
the occasion of the journalist's own speech, such as a news article that
he or she has published. Because the journalist would not have been
summoned but for having spoken through the news article, the summons is a plain cost levied by law on his or her speech. Because the
anticipation of having to answer under such circumstances may also
operate as a disincentive to publish like stories in the future, the law
curtails (i.e., abridges) his or her continuing freedom to speak. And
because the existence of this coercive process is a law inhibiting third
parties from freely speaking to the journalist, it abridges their freedom
of speech as well. Certainly, moreover, the journalist is an appropriate
party to assert such contingent, third-party free speech objections.
The summoning of the journalist is thus a case arising under the
first amendment, but that conclusion does not determine whether the
journalist may nevertheless be summoned and made to respond. 33 The
answer to that question is provided by Judge Hand's formulation: "In
each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the evil, discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 34 And, again, the same locational decisions,
once made at appropriate points on the vertical and horizontal axes on
our graphic, will unerringly permit us to draw the appropriate lines to
see whether they intersect at a point that is protected or unprotected.
How grave is the evil? In other words, what harm may ensue if the
journalist is not made to answer? Is it that a murder may go unsolved,
a libel plaintiff go uncompensated, a mere parking violation go undetected, or the source of atomic secrets given over to an enemy nation go
undetermined? How probable is it that, without the journalist being
made to answer questions (which question in particular?), the evil will
occur? That question, of course, may be divided into logical lesser
questions. What reasons are there for believing the journalist may
know a great deal about the matter? What alternative means may be
available (and at what cost) to secure that information without the
journalist's assistance? Each question is necessary to determine
whether summoning the journalist and making him answer is "necessary to avoid the danger." If the evil is very great (the atomic secrets
case?), even a minuscule chance that the journalist's compelled testimony might help may be sufficient.
33. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (rejection of blanket refusal by journalist to appear before grand jury investigating possible crimes reported by the journalist in newspaper with information allegedly derived from confidential sources).
34. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
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But we have said enough, for the point is not to resolve every hypothetical. It is, rather, to demonstrate the compelling capacity of the
Hand formulation to answer an immense number of first amendment
disputes. It is, in brief, a very powerful formula for resolving "the freedom" of speech, and is used more frequently than is generally acknowledged because its approach figures in time, place, and manner cases
and in indirect effects cases as well.

v
THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER THRESHHOLD

There are nonetheless objectionable features to the Learned Hand
formulation quite apart from the quintessential difficulty that it, too,
compels even conscientious courts to look outside the first amendment
to resolve such imponderables as what evils shall be deemed of moreor-less gravity than others in measuring the scope of "the freedom" of
speech. For example, when the evil to be avoided is serious, then, as
shown on the graphic, the test virtually dispenses with any probability
requirement as a precondition of punishing or of preventing speech.
Thus, a large (and uncertain) category of speech cases is treated not
significantly differently than in the second graphic in which perjury,
criminal solicitation, and obscenity were treated as kinds of speech per
se not within "the" freedom of speech. While that apparent conformance is exceedingly helpful and comforting in one respect (f. e., it reconciles those cases), in another respect it poses a severe problem.
According to that earlier graphic, "political" speech was not
among the outcast kinds of speech. To the contrary, it was altogether
within the 100% protected field. But the Hand approach precludes this
easy (and protective?) definitional address to the first amendment. For
the question according to the Hand test is not simply whether the
speech in question involved politics or government in some generic,
loose sense; rather, the focus is not on the speech at all, it is on the
alleged evil to be avoided by outlawing the speech.
The Dennis case is itself an example of the resulting problem. Eugene Dennis was prosecuted under the Smith Act35 for "conspiring" to
"organize" a group (the American Communist Party) whose purposes
included teaching the doctrine of the propriety of force and violence as
a means to "overthrow" the government of the United States. Since the
deaths of any number of persons ranks as a very grave evil, and since
Congress has the right to seek to prevent that grave evil, suppression of
speech under the formula is permitted by the first amendment on the
most meager probability that, unless suppressed, the speech might
35.

18

u.s.c. § 2385 (1976).
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bring about that evil.36 For all practical purposes, then, the case is
treated not much differently from one in which X offers Y $5,000 to
murder his spouse. X may be punished although Y was never inclined
to accept the offer and, indeed, was an undercover agent. The gravity
of the evil (of spousal murder) dispenses with the need to show any
probability that the danger can be headed off only by punishing the
offer.
In the murder solicitation case, doubtless we are untroubled by the
outcome. (But doubtless, too, because we entertain doubts as to
whether (a) such speech was ever imagined to come within the first
amendment and, that question aside, (b) why ~yone in his right mind
would want to have such speech protected by the first amendment.) In
the .Dennis case, however, many are troubled. It is not obvious that
advocating overthrow of the government contributes nothing useful.
Neither is it obvious that advocacy of violent overthrow, and not
merely of voting to change the form of government, was never imaginably within the first amendment. Rather, so long as there is no discernible prospect of serious harm actually occurring, the freedom to
state grievances passionately and angrily, protesting not merely the existing government but expressing a desperate feeling that nothing but
violence exists to modify that government, may be important speech. It
raises the unspoken questions. It makes visible a despair that needs to
be known. It demands answers from others that more genteel suggestions and less threatening discourse may fail to stimulate.37 It provokes
to be sure. But the .Dennis formulation ignores these central first
amendment values because it permits such utterances to be treated like
furtively made offers to hire a murder. It encourages and sustains their
suppression virtually without evidence of any actual or imminent danger. The dissenting opinions in the .Dennis case made effective use of
this point,38 and the history of prosecutions in the United States bears
36. The point is vigorously emphasized in the Douglas dissent in IJennis, 341 U.S. at 582,
584 ("So far as the present record is concerned, what petitioners did was to organize people to
teach and themselves teach the Marxist-Leninist doctrine contained chiefly in four books . . . .
Not a single seditious act is charged in the indictment. To make a lawful speech unlawful because
two men conceive it is to raise the law of conspiracy to appalling proportions.").
37. The point was well made by Justice Douglas in Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4: "[A) function
of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stirs people to anger." That provocative, offensive, or gratuitous language, attentiongetting by its willful offensiveness, may for that reason be highly protected as well, is elegantly
defended in Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). No
doubt the classic exposition of this view in the case law is in Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919). Exquisite reiterations appear in his dissenting opinion in
Gitlow v. New York, 368 U.S. 652, 672 (1925), and the Brandeis concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
,
38. 341 U.S. at 579, 581. See note 36 supra. The shortcomings of ])ennis in this regard are
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out the complaint. 39
A formulation to cope with this complaint would set a minimum
probability below which the alleged danger feared from this kind of
speech would never be sufficient to justify punishing the speech. It
might, for instance, look like this:

Probability
of
Event
("Clear and.....,)oi-·--·-Present")

.:::{:

:

....
. ··:.:;;;:i:·

Protected Speech

0%

~--------------------------~
0

Gravity of Evil
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Under this view, although violence itself may be passionately advocated, when the feared danger lacks clarity and imminence, such
speech remains within the latitude of speech that defines "the freedom"
of speech.40 And this, of course, is the earlier, substantially more profurther explored in J. ELY, supra note 9, at 107-08; M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE
SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 63-65 (1966); Strong, F!fly Years of "Clear and Present
])anger':· From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 SuP. CT. Rev. 41, 52-53. The ])ennis formulation is nonetheless defended. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 32-35 (1971).
39. See cases and materials cited in notes 5-8 supra.
40. John Stuart Mill's powerful essay, On Liberty, contains an extraordinarily resolute anticipation of the clear and present danger test in the concrete example of "tyrannicide," a topic that
in contemporary terms might embrace advocating the desirability of presidential assassination.
Note the anticipation oflater defenses as to why advocacy of illegal (and clearly dangerous) action
is deemed defensible:
If the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity, there ought to exist the fullest
liberty of professing and discussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered. It would, therefore, be irrelevant and out of place to
examine here, whether the doctrine of Tyrannicide deserves that title. I shall content
myself with saying that the subject has been at all times one of the open questions of
morals; that the act of a private citizen in striking down a criminal, who, by raising
himself above the law, has placed himself beyond the reach of legal punishment or control, has been accounted by whole nations, and by some of the best and wisest of men,
not a crime, but an act of exalted virtue; and that, right or wrong, it is not of the nature of
assassination, but of civil war. As such, I hold that the instigation of it, in a spec!fic case,
may be a proper subject ofpunishment, but only (fan overt act hasfollowed, and at/east a
probable connection can be established between the act and the instigation.
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tective formula proposed by Mr. Justice Holmes in 1919, in Schenck v.
United States: "The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear andpresent danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent."4 I In a slightly different iteration,
it is the formula reasserted quite unanimously by the Court in 1969, in
Brandenburg v. Ohio: "[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action." 42
There is, moreover, an addition to this formulation that may help
to alleviate a different kind of problem unresolved in the graphic depicting the Learned Hand formulation. Under that formulation, the
"gravity" of an evil is traded off against its improbability in measuring
the scope of "the freedom" of speech. Speech calculated (or likely) to
J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, & REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 78 n.l
(1910) (emphasis added).
41. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added).
42. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). The equivalent to the requirement that the danger must be
"clear and present" is that the lawless action must be "imminent . . . and . . . likely." The Brandenburg formulation is additionally rigorous in its scienter requirement, i.e., that the advocacy
must be "directed to" produce the lawless action (the "evil"). The formulation thus protects the
speaker to the extent that it forbids making the speaker an insurer of his audience; it holds him
criminally respousible only insofar as he meant to produce the imminent lawless action likely-infact to be produced by his utterances. In this respect, then, it borrows the advantage of Learned
Hand's original formulation in Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), and combines it with the advantage of the Holmes formulation. See Gunther, supra note 2, at 754-55. The
intent requirement mitigates a problem in the clear and present danger test well illustrated in the
following example by Justice Rutledge:
It is axiomatic that a democratic state may not deny its citizens the right to criticize
existing laws and to urge that they be changed. And yet, in order to succeed in an effort
to legalize polygamy it is obviously necessary to convince a substantial number of people
that such conduct is desirable. But conviction that the practice is desirable has a natural
tendency to induce the practice itself. Thus, depending on where the circular reasoning
is started, the advocacy of polygamy may either be unlawful as inducing a violation of
law, or be constitutionally protected as essential to the proper functioning of the democratic process.
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1948) (dissenting opinion). In the origina_l clear and present
danger formulation, intent was an alternative standard. Thus, in his Abrams dissent, Justice
Holmes had declared: "It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it
about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights
are not concerned." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (emphasis added}. Currently, even when merely "private rights" such as reputation are concerned, some degree of scienter (at least negligence) must be established to provide recovery of money damages. The
foundation case on this point is unquestionably New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The first amendment need for some
kind of scienter requirement to avoid the self-censoring consequences of a strict liability standard,
is self-evident
For an excellent general review of the Brandenburg standard, see Comment, Brandenburg v.
Ohio: A Speech Test for All Seasons, 43. U. CHI. L. REV. 151 (1975).
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produce relatively trivial evils (e.g., trespass on privately owned, vacant
lots) would, as we saw, be punishable only in the rare circumstance
where it induced such trespasses or, at least, was virtually certain to do
so. Left undetermined by the formula, however, was the extent to
which a legislature might add to the legal categories of things deemed
evil and, by doing so, provide a sufficient predicate for outlawing or
punishing additional forms of speech.
For instance, may not a legislature, acting responsibly within its
police power, describe as an evil the infliction of pain and suffering on
others? May it not specify mental anguish as one such kind of pain?
May it not provide redress (criminal and/or civil) against those inflicting mental anguish on others? If so, then much speech not hitherto
abridged may now be abridged: the speech newly forbidden must
merely make the occurrence of the evil highly probable-or cause the
evil to occur.43 Frequently, the substantive evil to be avoided (mental
anguish) will be not only a clear and present danger under the circumstances, to use Holmes' original formulation; rather it will be a fact.
Q.E..D. , the speech bringing it about can be redressed both in civil and
in criminal law.
Even the addition of "clear and present danger" to the formulation
thus leaves the graphic dramatically incomplete. There remains virtually unlimited elbowroom for legislatures to do in two steps what they
might not do in one. If a given kind of detested speech does not generate a constitutionally sufficient danger of one kind of evil to rationalize
its abridgment, the legislature may simply describe as an evil something the detested kind of speech is likely to bring about. The speech
may then, constitutionally, be abridged. For instance, the street comer
distribution of Communist handbills may be too remote from any likelihood of inducing violence against the government to suppress on that
account. But their distribution under the circumstances is nonetheless
very likely to produce litter. Litter in the public streets is assuredly
something a legislature may deem an evil. A flat prohibition of any
43. In Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Supreme Court upheld
the right of public school students to wear black (protest) armbands on campus, despite the claim
that the other children would regard the armbands as provocative and that the armbands might
cause some degree of mental anguish to students whose fathers had died fighting in Vietnam. The
Illinois Supreme Court adhered quite faithfully to that decision in refusing to sustain a municipal
ban on armbands iiivoived in the Nazi march, Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of
America, 69 Ill. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978), and was severely criticized for not sustaining the
restriction on a "fighting words" and "avoidance of mental suffering" rationale. See, e.g.,
Horowitz & Bramson, Skokie, the ACLU and the Endurance of .Democratic Theory, L. & CoNTEMP. PROB., Spring, 1979, at 328; Rabinowitz, Nazis in Skokie: Fighting Words or Heckler's
Veto?, 28 DE PAULL. REv. 259 (1979). For a related discussion, see Comment, The Fighting
Words .Doctrine-Is there a Clear and Present .Danger to the Standard?, 84 DICK. L. REv. 75
(1979).
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handbill distribution may, under the circumstances, be necessary to
avoid the danger of that litter. The result would be no more handbills,
Communist or otherwise.
The Holmes formulation, in its original terms, plainly embraces
this outcome since it requires no determination of the gravity of the
evil. It is not quite clear whether the Hand formulation does so. It
leaves open the possibility that although a complete prohibition of
handbills may be necessary to avoid the danger, the gravity of that evil
still may be constitutionally insufficient to 'justify such invasion of free
speech." In brief, is regulation of some evils (e.g., aesthetic blight,
mental anguish) otherwise within the capacity of legislatures to avoid
nonetheless prohibited when it curtails freedom of speech? In a later
and stronger formulation of the Holmes' test, the answer was emphatic:
yes. The first amendment forbids sanctions against speech except as
necessary to avoid "serious" evils. The appropriate graphic looks like
this:
100%
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r--------r--~------..

Protected
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("Clear and_, ------·--·--·+---------4
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Thus, Mr. Justice Brandeis suggested in I927: "Prohibition of free
speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society." 44
It followed that a certain degree of litter, unwelcome noise, mental perturbation, violated anonymity, and degraded reputation are withdrawn
from the general police power to protect against that latitude of free
speech contemplated by "the freedom" of speech.45
44. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
45. Thus, Justice Brandeis used the example of advocacy of a moral right or duty "to cross
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At its zenith, the developed Holmes-Brandeis depiction may be the
most sheltering perspective of the first amendment we have had. Its
formulation is as readily applicable to "time, place, and manner"
abridgments and to "indirect effects" abridgments as to direct abridgments. In this respect, it is as complete as the .Dennis formulation. Although it demands the judiciary make a determination for which the
first amendment itself supplies no textual assistance (namely, what external and immutable points of reference determine those things legislatures may declare to be serious evils and those they may not so
describe), 46 it is no worse than .Dennis in this respect. And, applied
unenclosed, unposted, waste land" as an example of an instance when such advocacy could not be
punished-even when directed to the urging of such trespass, "even if there was imminent danger
that advocacy would lead to a trespass,'' and even assuming that the trespassers, acting on the
advocacy, could themselves be punished. /d. at 377-79 ("[T]he evil apprehended [must be] relatively serious. . . . There must be the probability of serious injury to the states. . . . (T]he evil
apprehended [must be] so substantial as to justify the stringent restriction interposed by the legislature."). This rule was applied in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) ("The
right to use a public place for expressive activity may be restricted only for weighty reasons.");
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing breach of peace conviction for exhibitingjacket
with "Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse corridor before women and children, holding that the
privacy interests of the unwilling and offended persons from distasteful vulgarities in such a place
were insufficiently "substantial"); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("(F]reedom of
speech, though not absolute, . . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far
above public inconvenience [or] annoyance . . . ."); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263
(1941) ("[T]he substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high before utterances can be punished."); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (public
interest in clean streets insufficient to justify antiliandbilling ordinance). See also Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (family who had declined to sell rights in their story involving intrusion
by escaping felons into their home, who plainly wanted no attention, and who were placed in a
false (but not unflattering) light by a Life Magazine story, recovered money damages under New
York privacy statutes but were reversed in the Supreme Court). See the excellent discussion of
these issues in Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CoN·
TEMP. PROB. 326 (1966); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 1.
There, is incidentally, a tendency to say that a statute directly abridging speech must serve a
"compelling state interest," rather than that it must be necessary to avoid a "serious" evil. See,
eg., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 602 (1978). In certain respects, this different
figure of speech seems to be just as good, retaining as it does the notion that something more than
interests suitable to sustain the police power in general must clearly be forthcoming in first amendment cases. Because of the facile use of this phrase ("compelling state interest") in connection
with other clauses in the Constitution (e.g., the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend·
ment), however, we may come to regret the tendency to use it in connection with the free speech
clause. Other clauses are not as emphatic as the first amendment, a difference that sets this clause
apart. If (as seems desirable) one wants to retain a special stringency for the first amendment, it
may be vital to avoid linguistic usages that tend to blur or merge its treatment with cases, doctrines, and standards drawn from less robust sections in the Constitution.
46. An excellent example is raised by the facts of Missouri v. National Org. for Women, Inc.,
620 F.2d 1301 (1980), cer/. denied, 101 U.S. 122 (1981). The NOW campaign for convention
boycotts of states that had not ratified the equal rights amendment was found to be protected by
the first amendment right to petition the government and was not an illegal restraint of trade or
intentional infliction of economic harm. Since the NOW boycott was causing revenue losses by
Missouri motel and restaurant owners as part ofits efforts to influence the votes of state legislators,
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with any degree of tough-minded consistency, it creates a considerably
larger field of speech within "the freedom" of speech than the .Dennis
the issue was whether the government can forbid such economic "persuasion." It is factually
correct to characterize such efforts as a "conspiracy" to induce a "secondary boycott" that has as
its objective the coercion of third parties to express support for legislative changes they do not in
fact desire. It is also factually correct to characterize such efforts as the peaceful communication
of truthful information enabling each citizen to decide according to his own conscience whether,
in these circumstances, he or she wishes to take the information into account and, indeed, in what
way to take it into account.
The Supreme Court has suggested that even high-powered private propaganda, aimed at the
body politic to persuade the public to influence Congress to adopt laws destructive to competition
and of selfish economic advantage to the group mounting that campaign, is fully protected by the
first amendment. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The Court has also made clear, however, that government itself rna; not exert duress on private parties to compel insincere expression
of political support. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also Branti v. Finkel, 100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980); Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347 (1970). But none of these cases is especially instructive.
A bit closer to the point, the Court has sustained state laws that would restrict the dissemination of even truthful information when done for the purpose of stimulating an economic boycott
to induce a business practice that would itself violate a valid law, Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), but that issue is plainly not involved in this problem, since an insincere expression of enthusiasm for the equal rights amendment by Missouri businessmen would
violate no law. In dicta, the Court has also suggested that circulating information to induce a
boycott to force a change in the targeted business' own business practice may not be constitutionally prohibitable, despite the boycott's coercive effect. See Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) ("The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a
coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the First Amendment.").
But this, too, is inconclusive.
Indeed, the critical question has been avoided by judicial hesitancy to find any existing law
addressed squarely to the crucial issue. A fair test would snppose a statute framed in the following
way:
It shall be unlawful for any person or combination of persons to coerce or attempt to
coerce any other person in respect to their vote in any election or the manner in which
they choose to exercise their freedom to speak or not to speak on any political issue or
candidate, including within this prohibition the truthful communication to third parties
of information imparted for the purpose and with the effect of inducing a boycott of the
person whose vote or expression of political belief is meant thereby to be coerced, except
insofar as that person holds public office or is a candidate for public office.
Doubtless, speech may be used to coerce legislators to vote for propositions despite their views
respecting the merits, under the duress of being boycotted. Whether, consistent with the first
amendment, private citizens may also be coerced by economic pressure, however, has not yet been
determined.
In Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553 (D. Del.
1980), a motion to dismiss a private (consumer) antitrust action was denied in an opinion disapproving the court of appeals'__r~a_soning in the NOW case and holding that boycotts instituted to
induce consumers to exert political pressure on government are neither exempt from the Sherman
Act nor protected by the first amendment. I d. at 558 n.8. For a discussion (and reference to cases)
related to this fascinating problem, see Hersbergen, Picketing by Aggrieved Consumers-A Case
Law Analysis, 59 IOWA L. REv. 1097 (1974); Note, NOW or Never: Is There Antitrust Liabt1ityfor
Noncommercial Boycotts?, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1317 (1980); Note, Concerted Refusals to .Deal by
Non-Business Groups: A Critique ofMissouri v. NOW, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 143 (1980); Note,
Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 659 (1978); Note, First
Amendment Analysis of Peace.fol Picketing, 28 ME. L. REV. 203 (1976); Note, Protest Boycotts
Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. II31 (1980).
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formulation, because it demands that a clear and present danger be
shown in each case, rather than yielding to speculations of mere calamitous possibility as sufficient to sustain speech abridgments. Moreover,
in the face of the irresistible counterexample we confronted at the outset of these graphics, we evidently can propose no test for "the freedom" of speech that is free of the criticism that, at bottom,
administration even of this test remains subject to a discouraging
amount of judicial subjectivism.
VI
RECOMBINANT GRAPHICS

The conundrum of the irresistible counterexample is a difficult
one, as we have seen. In fact, it is so powerful a device that it mocks
virtually every effort, including the Holmes-Brandeis graphic, to render
the first amendment foolproof against the risks of .discretionary interpretation. That graphic demands that in every case there be a showing
of an actual, clear, and present danger that a serious evil imminently
lurks in an utterance punishable by law. That must mean, however,
that speech falling literally on deaf ears is never punishable. A villain
sadistically, knowingly, and falsely shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater escapes under cover of the first amendment if, perchance, the theater is crowded only by deaf persons reading subtitles on the screen. An
offer of bribery to an honest official who testifies it never entered his
mind to accept (and who, rather, at once reported the offer to the police) is not punishable, nor is the act of the lucky person who unwittingly solicits an undercover agent to murder his spouse, rather than a
gun-for-hire. No successful prosecution for criminal attempt in any of
these cases? That must logically follow unless we cope with the
counterexample by pretending that these are not instances of speech at
all but, rather, "conduct," "speech-brigaded-with-action," or some
other mendacious technique, or unless we admit to the nonexclusivity
of the developed Holmes formulation.
As it happens, the case law does in fact hedge47--even as Holmes
tended to do. 48 By combining two graphics we have already set forth,
moreover, we can see how the problem might be met straightforwardly:
47. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
48. See quotations and references at notes 17 & 42 supra.
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The description is a composite of the second graphic (certain kinds of
speech are wholly unprotected), plus the developed Holmes-Brandeis
graphic. It handles our problem, it has an administrable logic, and it
fits the syntax of the first amendment. The language of ''the freedom"
of speech that Congress may make no law abridging, in this view, may
be a qualifying phrase that communicates two considerations rather
than a single distinction. It may mean both a delimitation of kinds of
speech entitled to that latitude of speech constituting ''the freedom" of
speech and a certain latitude or scope of speech as reported in the Dennis formulation or as in the Holmes-Brandeis formulation. 49 As a
highly plausible matter, moreover, such an understanding of the first
amendment is surely not unimaginable.
We have thus far had little to do with history in this Article,50
49. A very timely example is provided by the Supreme Court's most recent commercial
speech case, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981). The plurality opinion
bifurcates commercial speech, declaring that some is not protected at all by the first amendment
and that the protected speech is subject to restriction if (but only if) three conditions are met:
We [have] adopted a four-part test for determining the validity of government restrictions ou commercial speech as distinguished from more fully protected speech.
(1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial
speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest,
(3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no farther than necessary to accomplish the given objective.
Id at 2892 (emphasis added).
50. But see notes 2, 5-8 supra. See a/so E. HUDON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
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partly to try to escape the obvious criticism that any such reference
tends to invite. Once history is admitted to be the guide, or even a
guide, to interpreting or understanding some clause in the Constitution,
we are in despair for the Constitution itself. It was partly to get free of
such disputes that all these other approaches were offered. 5 I Reintroducing history even as a means to select among nonhistory graphics for
depicting the first amendment seems a certain recipe for irony, if not
for disaster.
But perhaps no such fullblooded reference to any detailed or dogmatic history of the first amendment is required here. Rather, perhaps
all that is needed is the modest notion of historical reasonableness: that
this last graphic we have set out is historically plausible. Good reasons
can be offered to show why certain kinds of speech (e.g., offers of bribery) might plainly have been in no one's mind as within ''the freedom
of speech" that Congress was forbidden to abridge, 52 and why it might
be true also that speech well within ''the freedom of speech" might
sometimes, in some circumstances, also be subject to congressional
regulation. 53
Although this last graphic deals handily with the irresistible
counterexample and might not be historically implausible, it is still assuredly subject to severe hazards of judicial discretion and judicial misapplication. Courts will catalogue some kinds of speech as never
within the freedom of speech (e.g. , obscenity), thereby letting the outcome of cases tum on fatally different definitions of "obscene."54 As to
speech that survives that preliminary process of definitional winnowing, courts will also presume to catalogue degrees of evil or harms,
at least to determine whether the harm sought to be avoided is too trivial to tolerate an abridgment of protected speech even when the speech
produces that trivial evil. And, obviously, courts must superintend the
AMERICA (1963); F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776 (1952); sources
cited in Rabban, supra note 2, at 560 nn.236-41.
5I. See note 18 supra for an example of the vigor and confidence with which mutually exclusive views have been put forth respecting the ratification of the first amendment as a repudiation,
or as an absorption, of the common law of seditious libel.
52. See notes 17 & 19 supra.
53. This sort of dichotomy within the speech clause has been defended on purely prudential
grounds. Thus, Professor Tribe suggests:
In retrospect, the two-level theory may well have served a vital purpose in protecting first
amendment doctrine from general erosion by walling out entirely those categories of
expression that the Court was unready to protect but could not hold punishable as clear
and present dangers without diluting the meaning of that phrase.
L. TRIBE, supra note 45, at 671.
54. The following observation is, alas, not a parody of the case law of the last 20 years, but a
concise summary of it: "[T]he Court ha[s] moved from a view in which the obscene was unprotected because utterly worthless (Roth), to an approach in which the obscene was unprotected !f
utterly worthless (Memoirs), to a conclusion in which obscenity was unprotected even if not "utterly'' without worth (Miller)." Id at 661.
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adequacy of legislative factfindings and of jury adjudicative fact determination to say whether a serious evil was sufficiently clear and imminent under the circumstances to sustain the punishment of (protected)
speech.

VII
CORRELATING PROTECTION TO KINDS OF SPEECH

Despite their evident difficulties, the last several graphics do tend
to sum up the principal contending schools of first amendment interpretation during the past several decades. At the same time, there has
gradually developed still another view that does not, as did these
graphics, make quite so much depend upon which side of one-or-more
fixed lines a given kind of case falls. To be sure, this view also does not
escape problems of judicial discretion. But by introducing finer gradations of a particular sort, it may appear both more moderate and less
rigid in the measuring of protected speech. Interestingly, it complements the graphic we examined in the Dennis case.
Dennis defined the principal task of the courts as graduating the
kinds and degrees of evil to be balanced against the improbability of
their occurrence resulting from particular speech to determine whether
the degree of abridgment was unavoidable and therefore permissible.
Correspondingly, an increasingly fashionable view holds that it is important to graduate the kind of speech to be invaded.55 If it is political
speech (e.g. , rhetoric praising or abusing candidates for office, or rhetoric exaggerating the alleged effects, provisions, merits, or demerits of
existing laws), the speech is deemed of such central importance to the
functions of the first amendment that even the high probability of a
reprehensible evil (e.g. , that a far more honest and intelligent candidate
will lose to a dishonest, manipulative, selfish demagogue) will not justify any recourse against the wretched slanders of the victor. If it is
commercial speech, on the other hand, the evil of consumer deception
may be avoided on a lesser probability of fraud than in the political
speech case, although commercial speech will not, on that account
alone, be treated as 100% unprotected,56 as is obscenity or solicitation
55. Probably the leading example is the differentiated first amendment standards that must
be met as a prerequisite for recovering damages for libel, e.g., whether the plaintiff is a political
official (or at least a "public figure") or a private figure uninvolved in government. See Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For general discussions ranking speech protection
according to its bearing upon government and social change, see A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment
Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION REsEARCH J. 521; Kalven, The New York Times Case.· A Note
on "The Central Meaning ofthe First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191.
56. As previously noted (note 49 supra), the Court currently takes the view that some com-
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of homicide. Graphic_s carrying these additional views of first amendment priority may look like either of the following:
Protection of the First Amendment By Subject

mercia! speech is wholly unprotected while that which is protected nonetheless is subject to restric·
tion on grounds less demanding than if noncommercial ideological communication were involved.
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2890 nn.ll & 12 (1981). For a recent
helpful review and analysis on the subject, see Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment
17reory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372 {1979).
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These are unquestionably useful and interesting variations, 57 and
even our attempt to present them graphically is not quite adequate because it tends to understate their subtlety. The graphics imply a neat,
concentric order of speech values, relating the proximity of speech categories to core values of political self-determination, with commensurate
first amendment protection contingent upon the distance of an identifiable kind of speech from that first amendment center. Quite obviously,
however, a particular speech may in fact cut across these artificial lines,
readily embarrassing an attempt to say which l9nd of speech it was.
The libelous may well be related to the political utterance, the aesthetic
may be quite inseparable from the allegedly obscene. And in many
instances, a criminal conviction based on a statute that aims carefully
57. The new feature emphasized in these last graphics may readily be incorporated into a
composite statement that also integrates a great deal taken from several others. Such an integrated statement might read as follows: ''The question in each case is whether the circumstances
were sufficiently compelling to justify the degree of infringement resulting from the law, given the
relationship of the speech abridged to the presuppositions of the first amendment." The last part
of the formulation ("given the relationship of the speech abridged to the presuppositions of the
first amendment") takes into account an implied, first amendment rank-ordering of speech. In
tum, "whether the circumstances were sufficiently compelling to justify the degree of infringement
resulting from the law" provides an accommodation for the Holmes-Brandeis standard. It encompasses cases where the speech is highly protected (and thus may not be abridged save on a showing of clear and present danger of a serious evil), while nonetheless accommodating a lesser
standard when the speech is itself far removed from politics and policy (e.g., misleading consumer
solicitations redressable in private actions for fraud or restitution). Useful as well is the "degree of
infringement resulting from the law," insofar as it may accommodate differences ranging from
complete criminalization of certain utterances, through lesser incursions resulting from limited
time, place, or manner controls, or limited civil liability to specifically damaged individuals.
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only at the less protected aspect of a given speech (theoretically leaving
unaffected the speaker's prerogative to make his political or aesthetic
point in a different way) should not be sustainable, because often we
will know that the same point expressed differently would in fact not be
the same point at all. In public places, for instance, many will be offended by the studied vulgarity of crude expressions made in exception
to some important public policy. Still, neither more moderate nor
more intellectual discourse may say the same thing, even half as well,
as the bluntness of declaring: FUCK THE DRAFT. 58
In effect, then, these graphics illuminate an additional perspective,
but they do not reduce the margins of uncertainty, instability, external
reference, and elbowroom for judicial administration in the regime of
the first amendment. Perhaps, moreover, the point illustrated by these
variations is that there is no sure formula for reading the first amendment in any way that (a) copes with the irresistible counterexample,
(b) fits with its syntax, and (c) enjoys even a plausible congruence with
history, to make it foolproof. Which among these graphics seems better (or merely less poor) than the rest is assuredly debatable.
VIII
STANDARDS FOR STATE LAWS VS. FEDERAL LAWS

All along, we have nominally been examining the first amendment
alone. In the first graphic depiction that treated "All Acts of Congress," we were faithful to that task. In the very first irresistible
counterexample of the deliberate false shout of "Fire!" in a crowded
theater, however, we tacitly abandoned it. From that point on, the examples and counterexamples were indiscriminately state or federal. Indeed, most of them (e.g. , an antilitter ordinance) would in fact be
typically state or local. Outside the District of Columbia or the territories of the United States, few would be federal. Congress should have
little occasion, and very little power, to adopt run-of-the-mill police
power laws. And it may be significant that, numerically, the most telling irresistible counterexamples are predominantly just run-of-the-mill
police power counterexamples. Soliciting the murder of one's spouse,
for instance, is what state governments are designed to discourage. It
was not a concern for this kind of problem-or obscenity or libel-that
caused a new constitutional convention to be called for Philadelphia in
1787 to amend the Articles of Confederation and to enlarge the enumerated powers of the Continental Congress.
Our graphics have thus been askew. They have worked exclusively from the text of the first amendment, yet they have propounded
58. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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analyses indiscriminately inclusive of laws not arising under the first
amendment but of state and local origin. But the constitutional directive restricting state legislative power in respect to free speech is not on
its face even remotely like the first amendment. Indeed, on its face, it
acknowledges nothing special in respect to free speech at all. Rather,
the protection of free speech is, at best, just textually subsumed in more
general words: as an example of a "privilege or immunity'' of national
citizenship; as an example of ''liberty''; as a subject of legal protection
not to be denied "equal protection." In brief, we have indiscriminately
mingled examples that typically will not all arise under the first amendment, but will more often arise, rather, under a later amendment, the
fourteenth, which declares:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.59

Since 1925, it has been assumed nonetheless that the fourteenth
amendment pulls up the first amendment's speech clause into its own
provisions.60 Indeed, it has been held not merely that freedom of
speech is incorporated (or selectively absorbed) into the fourteenth
amendment, but that the standard of judicial review for state or local
laws affecting speech is coextensive with the standard applicable to acts
of Congress. The result is that Supreme Court cases adjudicating state
or local laws are fungible with those adjudicating acts of Congress;
each is as valid a source of precedent for the other as it is valid for a
case of its own kind.
There was, however, nothing inevitable in this development. The
very different texts of the first and the fourteenth amendments do not
demand this result. Mr. Justice Brandeis expressed serious misgivings
in an early case presuming to wed the first and fourteenth amendments
in this regard. 61 In an extremely provocative opinion, Mr. Justice
Harlan did likewise, just thirty years later, suggesting a different lati59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (1868).
60. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (dictum). Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931), and Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927), reversed state convictions on free
speech related grounds. Finally in 1931, the Supreme Court for the first time held a state statute
invalid under the fourteenth amendment as violative of first amendment free speech standards.
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), reviewed in F. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAo (1981). Not
until 1965 was an act of Congress actually held invalid under the free speech clause of the first
amendment. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
61. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of
procedure.").
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tude of state, vis-a-vis national, authority over obscenity. 62
Additionally, the equivocal history of the fourteenth amendment
is quite compatible with these suggestions. 63 For instance, it may be
eminently reasonable to hold (as it has been held) that free speech was
meant to be more amply protected against the states than other kinds of
"liberty" interests. 64 By itself, however, that proposition does not settle
whether state laws affecting speech shall be deemed valid or invalid
according to the standards applied to acts of Congress. The special
protection of free speech from hostile state legislation has been agreed
to by a number of distinguished justices who also believed that the latitude of state and of federal speech regulation is not identical. The
states, they thought, in some cases should be bound less tightly than
Congress. 65 Somewhat divergent regimes respecting freedom of speech
were thus readily available under principles of federalism in the United
States. A postscript may be appropriate to notice the possibilities of
this path not taken.
It may be argued that by refusing to take this path, the Supreme
Court has more successfully freed speech in the states by sheltering it
against the passions that local assemblies might translate into laws
abridging freedom of speech. By subjecting all local and state laws to
the same rigor of review as the Court has established for acts of Congress, the courts may haye made free speech in the states more robust
62. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
63. The most recent reexamination of this endlessly discussed question, with suitable references to the principal previous writings and cases, is Curtis, Tlte Bill ofRights As a Limitation on
State Authority: A Reply to Profossor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 45 (1980). As others have
also noted, Mr. Curtis quite sensibly suggests that the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment, as compared with the due process clause, is semantically less awkward
and historically better linked as the principal clanse in the association of substantive rights with
protection from abridgments by state government.
64. As suggested by Chief Jnstice Stone in United States v. Carotene Prod. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938):
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Coustitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
Or, as separately defined in the implications of an additional paragraph in the same footnote:
It is not necessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes [such as freedom of speech and particularly of political criticism?] which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected
to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
65. As suggested by Justice Holmes in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925):
The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in
the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word 'liberty'
as there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of
interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or
ought to govern the laws of the United States.
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than it might have been had differential standards been developed
under the fourteenth amendment than under the first amendment.
But this kind of reasoning cuts both ways. It is equally arguable
that had the Supreme Court not tied the review of acts of Congress to
the standard applied to state and local laws, the Court might well have
protected free speech more resolutely against Congress than it has. 66 In
this light, the more serious problem is that at the moment of reviewing
an act of Congress, the Court cannot help but be aware that it is simultaneously setting the standard applicable to the states as well. If the
Court does not think it appropriate to bind the states very tightly, it
must adjudicate acts of Congress with the same looseness it thinks appropriate for diverse state or local laws. It is simply a variation on the
familiar homily that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
Because acts of Congress reach more widely than state or local laws,
however, it may be a great misfortune to treat them in the same way. 67
There are very few realistic, irresistible counterexamples that can
be fielded to embarrass a near-absolute construction of the first amendment as applied to acts of Congress. In general, the amendment might
therefore be applied to acts of Congress with the vigor of the developed
Holmes-Brandeis formulation. In addition, the first amendment may
operate collegially with the tenth amendment: it may be read to restrict
the scope of enumerated powers v~sted in Congress even when, by itself, the tenth amendment would not be deemed to do so. This, in essence, is what Mr. Justice Harlan proposed in Roth v. United States. 68
66. Professor Tribe's observation, quoted at note 53 supra, respecting the prudential advantage of the Court's "two-level" address to freedom of speech might apply at least as well in this
context.
67. Consider Justice Harlan's observation in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 506 (1957)
(dissenting opinion):
The danger is perhaps not great if the people of one State, through their legislature,
decide that (a given book] goes so far beyond the acceptable standards of candor that it
will be deemed offensive and non-sellable, for the State next door is still free to make its
own choice. At least we do not have one uniform standard. But the dangers to free
thought and expression are truly great if the Federal Government imposes a blanket ban
over the Nation on such a book. . . . (T]hat the people of one State carmot read some
(books) seems to me, if not wise or desirable, at least acceptable. But that no person in
the United States should be allowed to do so seems to be to be intolerable, and violative
of both the letter and spirit of the First Amendment.
68. Id at 506-07. This proposal encompasses two separate issues. First, it addresses the
attenuation of the federal interest (j.e. , the commerce power or postal power may provide little
foundation for legislating in respect to a variety of subjects of no national significance). Second, it
assumes the states have the prerogative to experiment with a more robust regime of free speech
when, indeed, the speech subject-matter that an act of Congress seeks to regulate is not of such
demonstratable importance to submit it to a fiat, uniform, national policy.
This is but the logical corollary of the proposition that the extent to which states may restrict
speech should be at its weakest where states presume to address matters in no way peeuliar to local
or state concerns but rather address concerns common to the nation at large, e.g., speech deemed
threatening to national security. See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (dissenting
opinion); Z. CHAFEE, supra note 2, at 285-98. See also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
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In that case, an act of Congress prohibited the mailing of "obscene"
matter in the U.S. mails-an instrumentality over which Congress conventionally has an explicit, enumerated, plenary power. The invocation of explicit power given to Congress under article I did not, for
Harlan, end the first amendment inquiry, however. He would have
drawn from the first amendment a limiting principle qualifying the
power of Congress in respect to the post office, much as the Court subsequently did in National League of Cities v. Usery. 69 There, the Court
employed the tenth amendment to limit the reach of an act of Congress, otherwise valid under the commerce clause, when applied to state
and local employees. Although the post office may be a federal instrumentality, the subject of obscenity control is not a federal one, at least
not significantly. And the toleration of diverse regulation among states,
under a somewhat more permissive reading of the fourteenth amendment,70 would not present the same nationwide stultification of free
speech as would a flat, uniform act of Congress.
In brief, the virtue of a differential first amendment/fourteenth
amendment regime might be to read the first amendment for all that it
is worth, confining Congress very tightly. Somewhat more (albeit not
too much more) play may be left in applying the fourteenth amendment to the processes of state and of local government. If states or local
communities presumed to enact speech-restricting laws not addressed
to state or local concerns, but penalizing speech deemed contrary to the
best national interests or even the best international interest of the
United States, on the other hand, the Court would have a firm basis for
applying a very severe version of the free speech clause through the
fourteenth amendment, in the review of such legislation.7 1 As a composite of the first and the fourteenth amendments respectively, a suitable graphic that would capture the federalism component of free speech
analysis might look like this: 72
(1956) (state law presuming to protect United States from possible sedition deemed preempted);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (state law imposing additional restrictions on aliens
deemed preempted).
69. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Usery was the first case in four decades holding unconstitutional an
act of Congress under the interstate commerce power. The tenth amendment was found to limit
the authority of the federal government to regulate wage rates of state and local government
employees.
70. See the quotation from Mr. Justice Harlan at note 67 supra. Dissenting in Roth, Harlan
nonetheless concurred in the companion case of Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), upholding a state anti-obscenity statute and relying on the federaHsm distinction that states have
greater latitude in respect to this subject than does the national government.
71. See discussion and cases at note 68 supra for the suggestion that the states' police powers
are weakest in the face of free speech claims when the states presume to act on behalf of interests
not particular to the state or local community, but on subjects of national concern or of international impHcation.
72. A suitable formulation of framing questions arising under the free speech clause, consis-

FREE SPEECH CLAUSE

1982]

147

Police Power-to-National-to-International Subjects

Federal Acts
(First Amendment)

Protected

State Acts
(Fourteenth
Amendment)

Protected
Unprotected

Police Power-to-National-to-International Subjects

The graphic is essentially self-evident. The universe of speech
abridgments is divided between two sources: national and state. The
basis for division is the Constitution, which separately addresses restrictions on each source: the first amendment and the fourteenth
amendment. The Constitution's protection of speech against acts of the
national government is more substantial, since the first amendment is
far more emphatic and explicit in protecting speech. The propriety of
national sources of abridgment is most questionable when the speech
subject to such abridgment has no unique or apparent national consequence and thus, drawing from implications of the tenth amendment,
Congress' reliance upon enumerated powers may be treated skeptically.
A fairly rugged application of the first amendment, however, is still to
be expected even when acts of Congress deal with speech generating
evils highly appropriate for congressional concern. Insofar as a uniform nationwide restriction must generally operate more suffocatingly
than piecemeal local or diverse state patterns of restriction, moreover,
the argument in favor of confining Congress tightly is pragmatically
tent with our review of the subject up to that point, is suggested in note 57 supra. If one were to
incorporate an appropriate federalism element as well, then the issue in each case might be framed
as follows:
The question in each case is whether the circumstances were sufficiently compelling to
justify the degree of infringement resulting from the law, given the relationship of the
speech abridged to the presuppositions of the first amendment, and the relationship of
the law to the responsibilities of the level of government that has presumed to act
It is, of course, the last phrase ("the relationship of the law to the responsibilities of the level of
government that has presumed to act") that identifies the federalism component.
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strengthened. A looser regime may be tolerated in respect to state legislation under the looser text (and history) of the fourteenth amendment. Overall, a fiat and stale sameness of restrictions is less likely and
the erosion of substantial diversity of expression across the nation is
less to be feared. The propriety of state and local abridgments of
speech loses its own justification, however, when subjects of national
concern are at issue. Such abridgments, if made at all, must be made
by Congress and not by a gratuitous gesture of state or local
legislatures.
Finally, of course, the federalism graphic is not meant to be indifferent to our previous review. At both the state and national level, for
instance, the imminence and seriousness of the evil to be avoided are
still issues. And the subject matter of the speech may continue to make
a considerable difference. Talk about local political issues, candidates,
and policies may be as rigorously protected from state or local laws by
the fourteenth amendment as talk about national political issues, candidates, and policies shall be protected against abridging acts of Congress
by the first amendment. In these and other respects the federalism
graphic does not exclude our earlier efforts. Rather, it complements
them. Its addition may reflect a more mature treatment of the subject
as a whole.
CONCLUSION

In a dictum that has often been derided, Mr. Justice Roberts once
declared:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as
not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of
the Government has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. 73

It is not derision that ought to characterize such an effort, however, but
sympathy and a good faith desire to make it work. Among the many
clauses of the Constitution, moreover, the free speech clause appears to
be one of those best suited for this view of the judicial duty. The clause
is exceptional in its brevity, its clarity, and its use of concrete terms.
Ostensibly, it can be taken literally. And constitutionally, it is worthy
of being taken seriously.
Yet, as we have seen, laying the free speech clause beside a particular statute has left even highly conscientious judges doubtful as to
whether ''the latter squares with the former." We have now traced
nearly a dozen quite different pictures of the free speech clause. None
73. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
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was at odds with the language of the amendment. Few are foreclosed
by any fair assessment of its history or its past judicial exposition.
Each, moreover, is fraught with its own problems, and virtually all confide an unavoidable margin of textually uncertain discretion in our
courts. What, then, may one conclude?
Toward the end of this review, some effort was made to fit together
compatible ideas derived from several graphics by summarizing in
words what courts should look to in determining whether "the latter
squares with the former," ie., whether, as applied, a statute squares
with the first or fourteenth amendment. Two composite statements
were proposed in the footnotes-one summarizing a comprehensive
first amendment standard and the other incorporating fourteenth
amendment impacts as well.74 In context, i e. , given meaning and specificity by the discussion in this Article, each may offer some assistance.
Even so, they are not the main point of this Article as they do not answer well as "substitutes" for the first amendment itself. Tom loose
from the immediate context of this Article, each is too cumbeciome a
proposition to be worthy of comparison with the first amendment's own
words, which are so much more powerful and so much less facile. Infusing our surrogate rephrasings with every advantage of rigor and
clarification that may be wrung from all of our preceding discussion,
moreover, provides no assurance that, if adopted by courts as the working equivalent of the first amendment, either would be treated in fact
with due rigor. On their face, they most assuredly lessen the burden for
those who are hostile to speech they have no interest in defending
against other interests they transiently prefer.
In no sense, then, should such surrogate formulations be regarded
as literal substitutes for the first amendment, ie., as replacements of the
amendment's own terms. Indeed, one may rightly argue that it remains
vital in every case to start with the free speech clause itself. The singular value of the clause is that it quite properly throws onto the adversary of speech the whole weight of what ought to be a very heavy
burden indeed. The first amendment is difficult to improve upon in
that regard; no different formulation readily occurs to us that is nearly
so demanding and excellent. If, then, despite their obvious difficulties,
the suggestions advanced in the footnotes75 are useful, it is not as a
displacement or substitute for the first amendment. Rather, it is as but
a way of describing what one should minimally expect to encounter in
the course of attempting to discharge the burden imposed by the first
and fourteenth amendments.
Even when understood in this different, more subdued fashion, it
74. See notes 57 & 72 supra.
75. Id
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may fairly be said of our efforts that something has somehow been misreported or left out of account: that despite our best intention, too
much has been given away. Surely that criticism may be true, although
it is difficult to see the error in light of the problems we encountered
along the full course of argument we have now pursued. Still, it is far
better to think we have been unfair to the first amendment in giving too
much away than to belittle that amendment, make light of it, or think
we have gained an easy repose against its demands. That embarrassment should remain with us at the end. When the clause has been unraveled, its precedential applications examined, an equivocal early
history acknowledged, and other plausibly helpful matters tried on for
"fit," considerable doubt and uncertainty should remain. Two centuries removed from its original enunciation, we still see the free speech
clause as "through a glass, darkly." 76

76.

1 Corinthians 13:12.

